Asymmetrical information (English asymmetric information) is an economiceconomics term and designates the condition, in which two Contracting Parties do not have with conclusion and/or fulfilment of a contract the same information. The argument with problems, which result from asymmetrical information, is the subject of the information economics (English economics OF information).

The presence of asymmetrical information is regarded as a case limited of.

Neoklassik

A central acceptance of neoclassical economic models is the acceptance of complete , i.e. the participants know all environmental conditions, results and can the actions of their Contracting Parties observe. Information is free of charge available, contracts is complete, their fulfilment can be observed free of charge and completely interspersed.

Despite this appearing intuitively unrealistic acceptance, neoclassical models within certain ranges can be used still with good results, i.e. then, if a Partialmarkt the perfect market of the Neoklassik comes near, for example in the securities trading.

New

To the new against it explicitly the acceptance of limited was introduced. Provision of information is now no longer free, but causes transaction costs.

Depending upon an explanation goal one differentiates three different beginnings within the new

• the theory of the rights of disposal (property rights theory) is concerned with rights of disposal and action
• the transaction cost theory is concerned with the transactions, those the transmission of rights of disposal concerns and the costs resulting from it
• the principle aluminum agent theory again is concerned with client contractor relations.

The problem of asymmetrical information

All neoinstitutionalistischen beginnings go out with limited , however the problem of asymmetrical information is brought up for discussion mainly in the principle aluminum agent theory. Thereby a relationship between a client (Principal/Prinzipal) is regarded and a contractor (agent), who is characterized among other things by the fact that the Prinzipal has fewer information than the agent.

One differentiates thereby three Grundtypen of asymmetrical information (see in addition for example Picot/Dietl/Frank: Organization, 2. Aufl., Stuttgart: Poeschel, 1999, P. 88 FF.):

Hidden characteristics

Here the Prinzipal does not know certain, constant (and/or no longer free of charge changeable) characteristics of the agent (or the goods and services offered by it) before conclusion of a contract, it can thus the quality of the offered achievement ex ante to judge. Since the agent the Prinzipal can play wrong facts, the danger exists that it comes to Adverse Selection that systematically unwanted contracting parties are thus selected. As example for this the famous sour cucumber problem of George A. Akerlof serves.

A further example is the insurance market, if the insurance cannot judge, which risk the insured ones represent individually.

Hidden action and Hidden information

Here information asymmetries arise only to ex post office, thus after conclusion of a contract and during the fulfillment of a contract. Hidden action means that the agent has clearance, who cannot observe Prinzipal its actions (completely). Hidden information is present against it if the Prinzipal can observe the actions, whose quality cannot estimate however (e.g. due to expertise lacking).

Examples of Hidden action:

Employer-employee relationships

Workshop stay of a car

Insurance conditions

Examples of Hidden information:

Patient physician relationship

Computer engineer

Representative

In both cases is the problem that the Prinzipal cannot judge also ex post office, whether the resulting result was reached by qualified efforts of the agent, or (and/or like very much) whether the environmental conditions the result to have affected. If one goes for example with a cold to the physician and used up gets medicines, then it is rarely clear whether the improvement would have occurred not also without medical support ("“a cold takes one week, goes one to the physician only seven days. "”) This Unwissen can use the agent opportunistisch, without to be later exposed, which is called moral Hazard.

Hidden intention

Even if the Prinzipal possibilities has of observing an acting of the agent if no Hidden act ion or Hidden of information problems is thus present, then can it in certain cases still to problems by the fact come that the Prinzipal ex ante the intentions of the agent does not know. If the Prinzipal transacts investments, which it cannot cancel (irreversible specific investments, sunk costs), it comes into a subordinate position to the agent. It has no more possibility after contract conclusion of moving the agent to a desired behavior (no reliable Drohpotenzial). In this connection one speaks of the Hold UP - Danger, if the agent can use this, in order to provide an advantage at expense Prinzipals. An example for this is the classical case of extortion casecase/extortion. With the ransom delivery the Prinzipal transacted and is dependent an irreversible investment on the good will of the agent that also this fulfills the arranged part (e.g. release of hostages). Another example is short the rent increase after purchase (removal expenses than irreversible investment) of a dwelling.

Articles in category "Asymmetrical information"

We found here 25 articles.

Related Websites

We found here 3 related websites.

• Asymmetrical Information
  Asymmetrical Information. November 13, 2002. Do Not Be Alarmed. Do not check your screen. Yes, this is the same old Live From the WTC goodness, ...


• Asymmetrical Information
  Add Asymmetrical Information to your Google Toolbar. The Money Shot. Asymmetrical information is a member of the New York City blogads network. ...


• Galt, Jane: Asymmetrical Information
  Add Asymmetrical Information to your Google Toolbar. The Money Shot. Asymmetrical information is a member of the New York City blogads network. ...