Of a decision under risk one speaks in the context of the decision theory if the decision maker knows the probabilities for occurring the possible environmental conditions. These probabilities can both objectively admit to be (Lotto, Roulette) or on subjective estimations (e.g. due to past data) to be based.
Decision under risk is after the usual linguistic usage a Unterfall of decision under uncertainty. While one speaks with knowledge of probabilities of entrance of the environmental conditions of risk, a decision is present by uncertainty, if one knows the possible environmental conditions, however no probabilities of entrance to indicate can.
With decisions under risk a result matrix is present, which represents the decision problem: The Entscheider has the choice between different alternatives a_i, which entail different results in dependence of the possible environmental conditions s_j e_ {ij}. The probabilities w_j the different environmental conditions are well-known, whereby applies: 0 \ le w_j \ le 1 and \ sum_ {j} w_j = 1.
{| border= " 0 "
! width= " 5% " |! width= " 10% " align= " right " |s_1! width= " 10% " align= " right " |s_2! width= " 10% " align= " right " |s_3 | -! a_1 | align= " right " | 120 | align= " right " | 80 | align= " right " | 100 | -! a_2 | align= " right " | 100 | align= " right " | 100 | align= " right " | 100 |}
With decisions under risk the following decision rules application can find:
The Bayes rule is called also Here the Entscheider orients itself only after the expectancy values.
Since only the expectancy value of the respective alternative is evaluated a_i, the Entscheider is risk neutral, it is for example indifferent regarding the participation in a Lotterie by in which it wins with 50% probability 1 " and loses with 50% probability 1 ". In the above example is indifferent if applies: e_ {11} *w_1 + e_ {12} *w_2 + e_ {13} *w_3 = 100 (there independently of the probabilities w_j a safe "disbursement"), here thus: 120*w_1 + 80*w_2 + 100*w_3. Indifferenz would e.g. be present during uniform distribution, if thus applies: w_1 = w_2 = w_3 = \ frac {1} {3}.
The example of the Petersburger of paradox shows that the consideration of expectancy values does not correspond to the decision behavior of humans in the reality:
A Entscheider, which decides only after the expectancy value, would be now thus ready to thus pay for the participation in this Lotterie this fair price, the expectancy value (it would be then exactly indifferent between the participation and the nonparticipation):
The expectation value determines itself as follows:
Thus E (X) is thus infinite = {1 \ over2} * 2 + {1 \ over4} * 4 +" + \ frac {1} {2^n} * 2^n +" = 1 + 1 +" + 1 +" .
In the reality however nobody is ready to pay infinitely much money for the participation in the Lotterie.
In the rule the risk attitude of the Entscheiders finds by the fact consideration that also the standard deviation is considered. With risk-neutral Entscheidern it corresponds to the Bayes rule, with risikoaversen (risk-shy) Entscheidern sinks the attractiveness of an alternative a_i with increasing standard deviation. With risk-joyful Entscheidern attractiveness rises however.
A possible form of the is for example:
To a < 0 applies: The Entscheider is risk joyful, an alternative with a higher s an alternative with same expectancy value however lower s is preferred. To a > 0 applies: The Entscheider is risikoavers, an alternative with lower s an alternative with same expectancy value, but higher s is preferred. For a = 0 the rule does not correspond to the Bayes rule, the Entscheider is risk neutral, the standard deviation s has influence on the evaluation of the alternatives.
As a condition for application to the generally normaldistributed future net yields are considered or a square use function.
With the application of the Bernoulli principle the results must be converted e_ {ij} only with the help of a risk use function into use values. The individual risk use function u (e_ {ij}) reflects thereby the risk attitude of the Entscheiders again. A risk use function, which is a concave function, stands thereby for a risikoaversen Entscheider, while a convex function illustrates a risk-joyful Entscheider. It is however possible thereby that the risk use function exhibits both concave and convex ranges. This illustrates for example the empirically observable fact that humans play both Lotto (risk joy), and insurance lock (risk aversion).
Thereby the expectancy value of the risk use function is maximized.
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